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THE PROBLEM OF CAPACITY IN UNION SUITS:
A POTPOURRI OF ERIE, DIVERSITY AND THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE*
FOR purposes of suit, a union may be viewed either as an aggregate of
individuals or as an entity distinct from its members. At common law, a union
is an aggregation, not an entity capable of appearing as a party litigant;'
and the difficulty of joining all members in an action can serve to insulate
unions from suit or to deny them access to the courts. 2 Although many states
continue to regard unions as aggregates of individuals, the problem of multiple
joinder has been solved in most of these states through the class action,3 a
*Underwood v. Maloney, 256 F.2d 334 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 864 (1958).
1. See United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 385 (1922);
Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134, 141 (1928); Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalga-
mated Woodworkers, 165 Ind. 421, 423-24, 75 N.E. 877, 878 (1905) ; Tyler v. Boot &
Shoe Workers, 285 Mass. 54, 188 N.E. 509 (1933); Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572,
589-90, 78 N.E. 753, 760-61 (1906); WARREN, COaRaR ADVANTAGES WITHOUT IN-
comomRoN 667-69 (1929) (citing cases) ; Kaplan, Suits Agaist Unincorporated Asso-
ciaticns Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 53 MicH. L. Ray. 945, 946 (1955).
2. See, e.g., Collins v. Barry, 11 Ill. App. 2d 119, 136 N.E2d 597 (1956); Milam
v. Settle, 127 W. Va. 271, 32 S.E.2d 269 (1944). See also United Mine Workers v.
Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 389 (1922) ("To remand persons injured to a suit
against each of the 400,000 members [of the union] to recover damages . . . would be to
leave them remediless."); Sturges, Unincorporated Associations As Parties to Actions,
33 YALE L.J. 383, 384-87 (1924) ; Kaplan, supra note 1, at 946; Comment, 37 ILL. L. ra,.
70,71 (1942).
3. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1002, -1007 (1936) (equity), O'Jay Spread Co. v.
Hicks, 185 Ga. 507, 195 S.E. 564 (1938) ; ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 23 (1956), O'Brien
v. Matual, 14 Ill. App. 2d 173, 144 N.E.2d 446 (1957) ; Collins v. Barry, supra note 2;
IND. STAT. ANN. § 2-220 (1946), Nelson v. Haley, 232 Ind. 314, 111 N.E.2d 812 (1953) ;
Faultless Caster Corp. v. United Elec. Workers, 119 Ind. App. 330, 86 N.E.2d 703
(1949); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 507.070 (1952), Quinn v. Buchanan, 298 S.W.2d 413
(Mo. 1957); State ex rel. Allia v. Thatch, 361 Mo. 190, 234 S.W.2d 1 (1950).
In West Virginia, a union is generally unable to sue or be sued as an entity, and a
class action may not be brought on behalf of its members. See Milam v. Settle, supra
note 2; Marion v. Chandler, 139 W. Va. 596, 81 S.E.2d 89 (1954). But the union's
existence is recognized for some purposes. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4550 (1955) (per-
mitting union suit for protection of trade mark); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3501 (1955)
(permitting union trustees to accept gifts); Cook v. Collins, 131 W. Va. 475, 48
S.E.2d 161 (1948) (action by member against officers individually; rights under con-
stitution and bylaws of union at issue) ; State ex tel. Ben Franklin Coal Co. v. Lewis,
113 W. Va. 529, 532, 168 S.E. 812, 813 (1933) (dictum) (union members having
knowledge of injunction against officers are bound thereby) ; National Woolen Mills v.
Journeymen Tailors' Union, 100 W. Va. 627, 131 S.E. 357 (1926) (union's capacity
not considered in injunction suit for illegal picketing).
Courts have interpreted the Ohio provision for class actions, OHIO Ray. CODE ANN.
§ 2307.21 (Page 1954), as permitting labor unions to be sued as entities. See Williams
v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 81 F. Supp. 150 (N.D. Ohio 1948); Hillenbrand v.
Trades Council, 14 Ohio Dec. 628, 647 (Cincinnati Super. Ct. 1904).
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form of suit which allows a few individuals to litigate on behalf of all union
members.4 Other jurisdictions have abandoned the aggregate concept and have
enabled unions and other unincorporated associations to sue or be sued as
entities.';
Class and entity actions may be functionally equivalent,6 but the distinc-
tion between them can effectively determine whether union litigants meet the
requirements of federal jurisdiction based upon diversity of citizenship. If suit
is brought under rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-which
permits a class action whenever "persons constituting a class" are too numer-
ous for practicable joinder 7 --federal courts look only to the citizenship of
the class's named representatives in deciding whether diversity exists.8 On
the other hand, when a union litigates as an entity, the federal courts tradi-
4. See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1948) ; Tunstall
v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 148 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1945) ; Nelson v. Haley,
supra note 3; Nissen v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 229 Iowa 1028, 295 N.W.
858 (1941); 3 MoorE, FE)EAu PRAcrTcE ff 23.11 (2d ed. 1948) [hereinafter cited as
MooRE]; CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS or EQuirr 224-30 (1950); Witmer, Trade Union
Liability: The Problem of the Unincorporated Corporatidn, 51 YALE LJ. 40, 44-46,
50-62 (1941) ; Note, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1059 (1954).
5. This is generally done by statute. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-76 (1958);
DmE. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3904 (1953) ; NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-213 (1948) ; NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 2A :64-1 (1952). Some statutes grant unions capacity to appear as entities
only if they are defendants. See CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 388 (1954) ; MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 93-2827 (1947); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510:13 (1955).
In the District of Columbia, court decisions have endowed unions with capacity to
litigate as entities. See Busby v. Electric Util. Employees Union, 147 F.2d 865 (D.C. Cir.
1945).
Statutes and cases concerning capacity of labor unions are compiled state by state in
Forkosch, The Legal Status and Suability of Labor Unions, 28 TEMPLE L.Q. 1, 8-27
(1954).
6. That is, an entity-action judgment in one state may have the same effect as a
class-action judgment in another. See note 55 infra.
7. REPRESENTATION. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it
impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as
will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or
be sued, when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the
class is
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a primary
right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby becomes
entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which do
or may affect specific property involved in the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several
rights and a common relief is sought.
FED. R. Cnv. P. 23 (a).
8. See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Montgomery
Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1948); Biggs v. Lyons, 120 F. Supp.
389 (W.D. Ky. 1954); Fitzgerald v. Dillon, 92 F. Supp. 681 (E.D.N.Y. 1950); 3
MOORE 1f 23.13, at 3483.
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tionally equate its citizenship with that of all union members. 9 Although a
corporation can effectively achieve a single citizenship through the judicial
fiction that all its shareholders are citizens of its chartering state,'0 a similar
presumption 11 is not generally indulged with respect to unions.'2 Since diver-
sity jurisdiction does not exist if any plaintiff has the same citizenship as any
defendant,' 3 a large labor organization litigating as an entity will often be ex-
cluded from federal court because at least one member has the same citizen-
ship as an opposing party.14 In contrast, by selecting representatives with ap-
propriate citizenship, union members litigating as a class can frequently secure
federal jurisdiction-though the union itself could not.'"
9. See, e.g., Hettenbaugh v. Airline Pilots Ass'n, 189 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1951);
Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. Textile Workers, 149 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1957);
Douglas v. United Elec. Workers, 127 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Mich. 1955); 3 MoOrE ef
23.08. But see American Fed'n of Musicians v. Stein, 213 F.2d 679, 685-88 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 873 (1954) ("[T]he rule that the citizenship of unincorporated
associations generally is that of its members seems to be losing its vitality"; union could
have single citizenship for diversity purposes if it were shown at trial to have charac-
teristics similar to those of a corporation) ; Comment, 66 YALE L.J. 712, 724 n.174 (1957)
(collecting cases).
10. See Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 329 (1854); St.
Louis & S.F. Ry. v. James, 161 U.S. 545, 554 (1896) ; Constitution of the United States
of America, Analysis and Interpretatidn (Corwin ed.), S. Doc. No. 170, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess. 601-02 (1953).
Nevertheless, diversity jurisdiction claimed in a shareholder's action will not be de-
feated by the presumption that shareholders are deemed citizens of the chartering state.
Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U.S. 579 (1905); see S. Doc. No. 170 supra at 602. For a
criticism of corporate citizenship see M%,IcGovney, A Supreme Court Fiction: Corpora-
tions in the Diverse Citizenship Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 56 HArv. L. Rnv. 853,
1090, 1225 (1943). A corporation is now deemed to be a citizen of the state where it has
its principal place of business as well as of the states -in which it has been incorporated.
See note 71 infra.
11. Resort to this presumption in establishing a single corporate "citizenship" for
diversity purposes was apparently thought to be constitutionally required. Article III of
the Constitution gives federal courts jurisdiction over controversies between "citizens
of different States," and only individuals were held to be citizens. Bank of the United
States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 85, 91 (1809) ; Muller v. Dows, 94 U.S. 444,
445 (1876). See also Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 259 (1898) (corporation not a
"citizen" under article IV privileges and immunities clause) ; Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S.
496, 514 (1939) (corporation not a "citizen" under fourteenth amendment) ; McGovney,
supra note 10, at 853, 861.
12. See cases cited note 9 supra.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1952), as amended, 72 Stat. 415, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (Supp.
1958); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
14. Even if the requisite diversity exists between union members and their oppon-
ents, this fact may be all but impossible to prove. FED. R. Civ. P. 8 (a) (1) requires
that the basis of a court's jurisdiction be affirmatively alleged; hence, a union litigating
in a diversity action would have to establish the citizenship of all its members. Paster-
nack v. Dalo, 17 F.R1D. 420, 425-26 (W.D. Pa. 1955); Stein v. Brotherhood of Painters,
11 F.R.D. 153 (D.N.J. 1950); Harris v. Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp., 35 F. Supp.
153 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); Fowler v. Baker, 32 F. Supp. 783 (M.D. Pa. 1940).
15. See Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 148 F.2d 403, 405 (4th
Cir. 1945) (dictum); Sperry Prods. Inc. v. Association of Am. Railroads, 132 F.2d
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Whether or not a class or entity action is possible in federal court depends
initially upon the capacity of the litigants. Rule 17(b) directs the federal
judiciary to determine capacity by following state law, but varies the appli-
cable law according to the type of litigant. 6 The first sentence of rule 17(b)
states that "the capacity of an individual, other than one acting in a repre-
sentative capacity . . . shall be determined by the law of his domicile." The
next sentence stipulates that a corporation's capacity "shall be determined
by the law under which it was organized." Finally, the third sentence governs
"all other cases": "capacity ... shall be determined by the law of the state in
which the district court is held, except.. . that," when jurisdiction is founded
upon a federal question, an "unincorporated association, which has no such
capacity by the law of such state," may litigate as an entity. Thus, in a diver-
sit, case, if a union lacks capacity to sue and be sued as an entity under the
law of the forum state, only a class action by or against union members can be
brought in federal court.1 7 Conversely, if state law allows only an entity suit,
the class action-and readily achieved diversity jurisdiction-may be unavail-
able.
This second situation arose in the recent case of Underwood v. Maloney.'s
There, a diversity suit was brought by and against union members as a class
in a federal district court sitting in Pennsylvania, a state which permits a
union to litigate only as an entity.19 Plaintiff Underwood was a Pennsylvania
citizen and the ousted president of a local union affiliated with the Interna-
tional Union of Operating Engineers. He sought reinstatement by suing
Maloney-the International president and an Illinois citizen-both individually
and as representative of the defendant class. In a companion action, several
members of the local (citizens of Pennsylvania and Delaware) brought a
408, 412 (Zd Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 744 (1943) (dictum); Moore, Federal
Rides of Civil Procedure: Some Problents Raised by the Preliminary Draft, 25 GEO. L.J.
551, 566 (1937).
16. CAPACITy To SuE oR BE SuED. The capacity of an individual, other than one
acting in a representative capacity, to sue or be sued shall be determined by the
law of his domicile. The capacity of a corporation to sue or be sued shall be de-
termined by the law under which it was organized. In all other cases capacity to
to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of the state in which the district
court is held, except (1) that a partnership or other unincorporated association,
which has no such capacity by the law of such state, may sue or be sued in its
common name for the purpose of enforcing for or against it a substantive right
existing under the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that the
capacity of receiver appointed by a court of the United States to sue or be sued
in a court of the United States is governed by Title 28, U.S.C. §§ 754 and 959(a).
FED. R. Civ. P. 17 (b).
17. See Benz v. Campania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 233 F.2d 62, 67 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied on this issue, 352 U.S. S90 (1956), aff'd on other grounds, 353 U.S. 138 (1957) ;
White v. Quisenberry, 14 F.R.D. 348 (W.D. Mo. 1953) ; Pascale v. Emery, 95 F. Supp.
147 (D. Mass. 1951).
18. 256 F.2d 334 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 864 (1958).
19. See note 24 infra.
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class action on behalf of the local membership against Maloney and another
union official (who was a citizen of the District of Columbia) as representa-
tives of the defendant international union members. The federal district court
entertained the suits and decided them on the merits.2 0 On appeal, the Third
Circuit ordered the second action dismissed.21 The appellate court reasoned
that the suit, though formally a class action, was in reality between the local
and international unions.2 2 Since a union is neither an individual nor a cor-
poration, the court determined capacity on the basis of the third sentence of
rule 17(b), that is, on the basis of the law of the forum state.23 Looking to
the Pennsylvania rule requiring unions to litigate as entities,24 the court con-
20. Both actions arose out of the same controversy. Underwood, suspended from
union office and membership, sued for reinstatement and for damages. One Dawson, on
behalf of the local's members, sued for an accounting, for an injunction against the
"Order of Supervision" whereby Maloney had placed the local in trusteeship, and for
reinstatement of the local's officers. 14 F.R.D. 222 (E.D. Pa. 1953) (determination of
procedural motions), 16 F.R.D. 3 (E.D. Pa. 1954) (same), 152 F. Supp. 648 (E.D. Pa.)
(judgments for defendants in Underwood action, Underwood having had "procedural
due process" under International's constitution; in Dawson suit, court set aside trustee-
ship over local union, but held that a trustee might again be appointed if International's
constitution and court's opinion complied with), judgment stayed, 245 F.2d 797 (3d Cir.
1957) (injunction issued to maintain status quo pending disposition of appeals), rev'd in
part, aff'd in part, 256 F.2d 334 (3d Cir.) (since class action would have been unavail-
able under Pennsylvania law, actions by Dawson and Underwood against Maloney as
representative must fail and cases be dismissed; insofar as Underwood was suing IMaloney
as individual, judgment of lower court in favor of defendant affirmed), petition for re-
hearing denied, 256 F.2d 340 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 864 (1958). At present,
the same issues are again being litigated, this time in the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware. The parties plaintiff remain the same but the representa-
tive defendant is Maloney's successor, Delaney. Underwood v. Delaney, 6 CCH LAB. L.
REP. (36 CCH Lab. Gas.) 11 65034 (D. Del. Nov. 28, 1958) (venue improperly laid).
21. 256 F.2d 334, 338. (3d Cir. 1958). The judgment in the first action was affirmed
insofar as it related to Maloney individually.
22. Id. at 337-38.
23. See note 16 supra.
24. The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure make the entity action mandatory for
plaintiff and defendant unions.
Rule 2152. Actions by Assdciations.
An action prosecuted by an association shall be prosecuted in the name of a mem-
ber or members thereof as trustees ad litem for such association. An action so pros-
ecuted shall be entitled "X Association by A and B, Trustees ad Litem" against the
party defendant.
Rule 2153. Actio'ns against Associations.
(a) In an action prosecuted against an association it shall be sufficient to name as
defendant either the association by its name ... or any officer of the association as
trustee ad litem for such association in the manner prescribed by Rule 2152.
[Note of Procedural Rules Committee to Rule 2230, the class action provision :]
Suits by or against unincorporated associations are not to be brought as class suits
under this Rule. Such suits are now regulated by Pa. R.C.P. Nos. 2152 and 2153.
PA. R. Civ. P. 2152-53(a), 2230 note; see Laudenslager v. Wiegner, 22 Lehigh County
L.J. 137 (Pa. C.P. 1946); Winters v. New Johnny J. Jones Exposition, 6 Beaver
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cluded that this rule deprives them of capacity to sue or be sued in class ac-
tions.2  The Third Circuit further said that the second suit, viewed as one
between two entities, must be dismissed because some members of the plain-
tiff local had the same citizenship as some members of the defendant interna-
tional.2 0
In a subsequent opinion denying a petition for rehearing,2 7 the court ad-
hered to its original decision but altered its rationale. This time, the court
purported to treat the class action as a suit between groups of individuals,
and regarded the capacity of the named representatives as critical. The excep-
tion to sentence one of rule 17(b) was deemed apposite on the ground that
the individual litigants were "acting in a representative capacity." 28 Turning,
therefore, to sentence three (which governs "all other cases"), the court held
that the litigants' capacity must be determined by examining the law of the
forum state.20 The court then found that the individual litigants lacked capa-
city, but not on account of any personal disability. Rather, the Pennsylvania
law requiring unions to litigate as entities was deemed to deprive union mem-
bers of capacity to represent their fellow members in a class action.30 The
court also answered the contention that its construction of rule 17(b) would
deny effect to rule 23(a). Though 23(a) makes the class action generally
available, the court ruled that such an action cannot be brought if the class
representatives lack juridical capacity.3 1
County L.J. 138 (Pa. C.P. 1944); 3 GoODRacH-AmRAm, STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRAC-
TICE § 2152-2 (1953) [hereinafter cited as GooDacn-AmmRAax]; Stern, Intra-Union Ac-
tivities, Membership and Collective Bargaining Rights under Pennsylvania Law, 29
TEmPLE L.Q. 38, 40-41 (1955).
The effect of the state rules has been considered in one diversity case in federal
court, resulting in the class action being dismissed. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v.
Textile Workers, 152 F. Supp. 19, 20 (E.D. Pa. 1957). But see Malarney v. Upholsterers'
Union, 7 F.R.D. 403, 405 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (class action allowed without reference to
present state practice); Philadelphia Local 192, AFT v. American Fed'n of Teachers,
44 F. Supp. 345, 346 (E.D. Pa. 1942) (same); Durkin v. Rieve, 10 F.R.D. 71, 73 (E.D.
Pa. 1949) (class action dismissed on other grounds) ; Green v. Gravatt, 34 F. Supp. 832
(W.D. Pa. 1940) (same).
25. 256 F2d at 338.
26. Ibid. See note 13 supra.
27. 256 F.2d at 340.
28. For the text of rule 17(b), see note 16 supra.
29. This aspect of the court's analysis was not clear. It stated: "Since under the
law of Pennsylvania individuals lack the capacity to be sued as class representatives of an
unincorporated association, they have no such capacity in the federal courts." 256 F2d at
342. By clear implication, the court was concerned with representative capacity alone,
since it looked to the law of the forum state. Had it been concerned with the individual
capacity of the named representatives, it would have been referred by rule 17(b) to the
law of the representatives' respective domiciles. Furthermore, the court cited as authori-
ty 3 Mooam 17.18, which deals with "Capacity of Individual Acting in a Representa-
tive Capacity."
30. 256 F.2d at 342.
31. Ibid. Rule 23(a) is quoted in note 7 supra.
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The Third Circuit's original opinion postulates that, realistically viewed,
the class action was between two unions rather than two groups of members.
Accordingly, the opinion regards the capacity of the unions themselves as
decisive. And, confusing a union with a class composed of its members, the
opinion advances the theory that, under Pennsylvania law, a union lacks capa-
city to sue or be sued as a class. This analysis misconstrues the nature of the
class action, which is a procedural device designed to obviate the joinder of
numerous parties, and which is appropriately used only by or against a group
of individuals, not a single entity. 32 Although a union may, in effect, sue or
be sued in a class action,3 3 the representative members and not the union will
actually appear in the litigation.34 If the union were considered the only party
litigant, the requirements of rule 23(a) could never be satisfied, for it does
not authorize a class action except when "persons constituting a class are so
numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court." 3r
The Underwood court evidently presupposed that an unincorporated asso-
ciation may possess both capacity to appear as an entity and capacity to appear
as a class. The third sentence of rule 17(b) implies, however, that a union
lacks capacity to litigate save as an entity. The sentence states that: "In all
other cases capacity to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of the
state in which the district court is held, except (1) that .. . [an] unincor-
porated association, which has no such capacity by the law of such state, may
sue or be sued in its common name [to enforce a federal right]."36 The phras-
ing of the "except" clause indicates that the "capacity" which state law may
deny is the capacity to sue or be sued as an entitys 7 Indeed, previous diver-
sity cases have read rule 17(b) in this manner, for they have uniformly as-
sumed that, if a state fails to accord unions entity capacity, unions have no
capacity whatever in the federal courts of that state.38 Only their members
32. See Giordano v. Radio ,Corp. of America, 183 F2d 558, 561 (3d Cir. 1950)
("[Slince there are only fifteen other members of this class . . .it could hardly be held
that they constitute a class 'so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all
before the court.'") ; Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 194 F.2d 737, 740 (7th Cir. 1952) ;
System Fed'n No. 91, Ry. Employes' Dep't v. Reed, 180 F2d 991 (6th Cir. 1950);
Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v. Reiner, 45 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. La. 1942) (dictum); CHAFEE,
SOAIE PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 243 (1950); Wheaton, Representative Suits Involving Nu-
merous Litigants, 19 CORNELL L.Q. 399 (1934) ; Note, 36 H v. L. REv. 89 (1922).
33. See note 55 infra.
34. See Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 233 F.2d 62, 68 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied on this issue, 352 U.S. 890 (1956), aff'd on other grounds, 353 U.S. 138
(1957) (answering argument that difference between class and entity actions based on
"semantics, not substance," court held that union was not a party to class action against
members, and that its treasury could not be reached).
35. See note 7 supra.
36. Emphasis added.
37. "Provisions in Rule 24 [now rule 17(b)] . . .give ... [an] unincorporated as-
sociation the capacity to sue or be sued as an entity in the federal courts in those states
which recognize the entity theory ... ." Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Prcycedure: Some
Problems Raised by the Preliminary Draft, 25 GEo. L.J. 551, 566 (1937).
38. See cases cited note 17 supra.
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can then sue or be sued, either by joining all of them or by means of a class
action. Furthermore, if a union is viewed as possessing entity capacity and
no other, "capacity" can be read throughout rule 17(b) to mean the right of
a party to litigate in its own name regardless of the cause of action.39 For
example, the individual who is of age and mentally competent in his domicile,
and the corporation which is authorized to litigate by its chartering state,
have the capacity which rule 17(b) requires.40 Similarly, a union has capa-
city if, in the forum state, it is authorized to litigate as a single party and in
its own name. 4' The Third Circuit should have recognized, therefore, that
39. See Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure-IL. Pleadings and Par-
ties, 44 YArLE L.J. 1291, 1312-17 (1935).
The capacity to sue and be sued and the right to enforce a particular claim should
be distinguished. De Franco v. United States, 18 F.R.D. 156, 159 (S.D. Cal. 1955)(dictum); Magee v. McNany, 10 F.R.D. 5, 11 (W.D. Pa. 1950) (dictum); see Angel v.
Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947); 3 MooRE 17.16. But see McCollum v. Mayfield, 130
F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1955) (though felon deprived of capacity by law of domicile,
rule 17(b) held not to preclude suit in federal court on constitutional right). Compare
David Lupton's Sons Co. v. Automobile Club of America, 225 U.S. 489 (1912) (holding
that plaintiff corporation, assumed to have capacity under the law of its domicile, had
capacity to litigate in a federal court sitting in New York), with Woods v. Interstate
Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949) (overruling Lupton to the extent that the action there
was not barred on the ground that the corporation, having failed to comply with New
York's law governing foreign corporations, would have been unable to enforce its claim
in the New York courts).
40. See De Franco v. United States, supra note 39, at 159 ("'Capacity' raises only
the question of whether the plaintiff is free from general disability such as infancy, in-
sanity or some other form of incompetency."); Magee v. McNany, supra note 39.
Corporations invariably have capacity to sue and be sued. See Hearings Before the
House Committee on the Judiciary of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the District
Courts of the United States, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., ser. 17, at 19 (1938) :
Mr. Ramsay: You do not mean to state that you would approve any kind of a law of
any State which would give immunity to any corporation organized under the laws
of that State from being sued anywhere in the United States?
Mr. Mitchell (Chairman of Advisory Committee for Rules of Civil Procedure) : Not
at all. I do not approve any such thing as that. I do not know of any such case,
a business corporation.
Mr. Ramsay: . . . If you take section (b) of rule 17 in its entirety . . . Delaware
could practically exempt a corporation from being sued and then if it should not have
that exemption clause in its charter, then the law that is applicable in the State
where it might be sued shall apply, but if it is in there you cannot sue them at all.
Mr. Mitchell: I think we ought to deal with realities.
The issue of corporate capacity to litigate usually arises on dissolution, when, although
defunct for most purposes, the corporation may still have capacity to litigate under the
law of its domicile. See, e.g., Signal Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 46 F. Supp. 276
(S.D. Cal. 1942); Display Stage Lighting Co. v. Century Lighting, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 937
(S.D.N.Y. 1941).
41. See Busby v. Electric Util. Employees Union, 147 F2d 865 (D.C. Cir. 1945);
Williams v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 81 F. Supp. 150, 151 (N.D. Ohio 1948) ; Railway
Employees' Dep't v. Virginian Ry., 39 F. Supp. 354, 356 (E.D. Va. 1941) ; cf. Schmidt
v. Peoples Tel. Union, 138 F.2d 13, 14 (8th Cir. 1943).
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a class action does not involve union capacity, and that the only question to be
answered under rule 17(b) is whether the named representatives have capa-
city as individuals.
Had the court, on denying rehearing, consistently treated the class action
as a suit by or against individuals, it would probably have found that the pre-
requisites of rule 17(b) were met. To be sure, the court correctly began its
analysis by looking to 17(b)'s first sentence in order to establish the capacity
of the individual litigants. But the court wrongly assumed that persons litigat-
ing as members of a class come within the exception to that sentence, which
-embraces "those acting in a representative capacity." As used in this
phrase, the term "representative" refers to fiduciaries like executors and
guardians for minors and incompetents. 43 In the original draft, 17(b) simp-
ly ruled that an individual's capacity is governed by the law of his domicile.41
The provision for "representatives" appeared in a later draft.4  It serves to
continue prior federal practice regarding personal fiduciaries, 46 and to com-
plement the traditional rule that an executor or guardian, as a creature of
state statute, may not litigate beyond the borders of the appointing state.
4 7
42. See note 16 supra.
43. See, e.g., Fallat v. Gouran, 220 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1955) (guardian of incom-
petent) ; Jones v. Schellenberger, 196 F.2d 852 (7th Cir. 1952) (administratrix) ; Cooper
v. American Airlines, Inc., 149 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Morris v. Bradley, 139 F. Supp.
519 (E.D. Pa. 1956) (guardian of minor); Straub v. Jaeger, 9 F.R.D. 672 (E.D. Pa.
1950) (administrator); Orloff v. Hayes, 7 F.R.D. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1946) (exccutrix);
Buchele v. Trucking, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 954 (E.D. Mich. 1944) (guardian of minor).
Research has revealed only one case other than Underwood in which the "representa-
tive capacity" clause in rule 17(b) was held to refer to the capacity of a class repre-
sentative. The Underwood holding had been foreshadowed the previous year by Lloyd
A. Fry Roofing Co. v. Textile Workers, 152 F. Supp. 19 (E.D. Pa. 1957); both cases
arose in the same district court. Fry Roofing held that the class representatives lacked
capacity under rule 17(b) because "under Pennsylvania law individuals lack the capacity
to be sued as class representatives of an unincorporated association." 152 F. Supp. at 20.
44. See U.S. SUPREME COURT ADVSORY Comm. ON RuLEs FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE,
PRELuMINARY DRAFT OF RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE rule 24 (1936); U.S. SUPR'ME
COURT ADVISORY Comm. ON RULES FOR CVIL PROCEDURE, PROPOSED RULES OF CIVIL PRO-
CEDuRE rule 17(b) (1937).
45. See U.S. SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE,
FINAL REPORT rule 17(b) (1937).
46. See Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure-II. Pleadings and Par-
ties, 44 YALE L.J. 1291, 1312-13 (1935).
47. On administrators and executors, see Lawrence v. Nelson, 143 U.S. 215, 222
(1892) ("[T]he general rule [is] that an administrator's power to act . . . is limited to
the State from whose courts he derives his authority, and that therefore he cannot sue
or be sued in another State in which he has not been appointed administrator.") ;
The plaintiff certainly cannot maintain this bill as administrator . .. because he
admits that he has never taken out letters of administration in New York; and the
letters of administration granted to him in Michigan confer no power beyond the
limits of that State, and cannot authorize him to maintain any suit in the courts,
either State or national, held in any other State.
Johnson v. Powers, 139 U.S. 156, 157-58 (1891) ; Noonan v. Bradley, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.)
394, 400 (1869); Burrowes v. Goodman, 50 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1931); Derrick v. New
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In contrast, a class representative is either self-appointed or chosen at
random from among the eligible members of a class.48 Unlike a fiduciary,
his interest in litigation is personal, 49 and he cannot be held accountable
for his conduct of a suit.50 Consequently, the exception to 17(b)'s first
England Greyhound Lines, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 496, 497 (D. Mass. 1957); Feldman v.
Gross, 106 F. Supp. 308 (N.D. Ohio 1952); Coburn v. Coleman, 75 F. Supp. 107 (W.D.
S.C. 1947). The rationale of the rule is stated in Laughlin & McManus v. Solomon,
180 Pa. 177, 179, 36 At. 704 (1897) :
The technical ground for refusing a right of action dependent solely on foreign
letters testamentary is that it would be giving extra territorial force to the judg-
ment or decree of a foreign court or officer, and an interference with the juris-
diction of our own courts. But the more practical ground is that of public policy
to prevent assets from being taken out of the state to the possible injury of our
own citizens, creditors, who might thus be forced to go to a foreign tribunal to
obtain satisfaction of their claims.
For the same rule as applied to guardians, see Morgan v. Potter, 157 U.S. 195, 107
(1895); Pulver v. Leonard, 176 Fed. 586 (C.C.D. Minn. 1909); Ex parte Huffman,
167 Fed. 422 (C.C.W.D. Tex. 1909); STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICr OF LAws 443-
46 (2d ed. 1951).
48. The only prerequisite for representing members of a class is that laid down by
rule 23(a). The representative must "fairly insure the adequate representation of all
.... " Adequacy of representation is thus to be determined by the courts. See Hansberry
v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Kentucky Home Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Duling, 190 F.2d
797 (6th Cir. 1951); Fitzgerald v. Jandreau, 16 F.R.D. 578 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); 3 MOORE
fT 23.07.
49. In the "true" class action, a representative's interests are held jointly or in com-
mon with all other members of the class. See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble,
255 U.S. 356 (1921); Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853); System
Fed'n No. 91, Ry. Employes' Dep't v. Reed, 180 F.2d 991 (6th Cir. 1950); Rank v.
Krug, 142 F. Supp. I (S.D. Cal. 1956) ; 3 MooRE 1 23.08.
When the class action is "spurious" or "hybrid," the class representative is even more
readily distinguishable from the fiduciary, since the right which the representative is
enforcing is held individually and could therefore have been litigated without joining all
other members of the class. See, e.g., Schatte v. International Alliance of Theatrical
Stage Employees, 183 F.2d 685 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 827 (1950) (spurious
class action lies where individuals each have damage claims arising out of loss of em-
ployment, and common questions of law or fact are involved) ; Pentland v. Dravo Corp.,
152 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1945) (class was spurious since overtime wage claims against
employer were held individually and it was unnecessary to join all others who might have
similar claims); Lucy v. Adams, 134 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Ala.), aff'd, 228 F.2d 619
(5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 931 (1956) (Negroes may bring spurious class
action to test their personal rights to gain admission to segregated university). For an
example of the "hybrid" class action, see Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973, 980 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 875 (1952). See also Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives v.
Deckert, 123 F.2d 979, 983 (3d Cir. 1941) ; 3 MOORE IT 23.09-.10.
50. Absent members of a class whose interests are not adequately represented in a
class action are not bound by the adjudication. Their protection against incompetent or
collusive conduct of the litigation is therefore the right to relitigate the issues which, as
to them, are not res judicata. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) (denial of due
process to bind members of class not adequately represented). FED. R. CIrV. P. 23(c)
provides further protection to absent members of the class by requiring court approval
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sentence should not be interpreted to encompass class representatives. And
the capacity of a class representative, like that of an individual who is liti-
gating his own cause of action, should be determined as the first sentence
of rule 17(b) directs-by the law of his domicile. Since all the named
parties in the Underwood action were apparently competent to appear in
the courts of their home states, and since no overlap existed between the
citizenship of plaintiff and defendant representatives, the class action ought
not to have been dismissed for want of capacity or diversity.
If taken in its logical conclusion, the interpretation of rule 17(b) expounded
in the later appellate opinion would seriously limit the availability of class
actions under rule 23(a). According to Underwood, federal courts could not
entertain class actions when sitting in states which restrict or do not permit
them, since individual capacity to represent a class would exist only if the
state allowed such representation in its own courts. But one policy behind
rule 23 (a) is to make suits involving unincorporated associations procedural-
ly possible in federal courts.5 1 This policy, if not the mere existence of rule
23(a) itself, would appear to dictate that, given diversity of citizenship,
federal courts should take jurisdiction over class actions irrespective of local
law.
Had the Third Circuit found that all the Underwood litigants possessed
capacity, that court would have had to face yet another question in passing on
the trial court's jurisdiction: If a federal court entertains a class action when
sitting in a state whose courts allow only entity actions, has the doctrine of
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 52 been violated? The answer to this question turns
on whether the state rule barring class actions is "substantive"-requiring the
federal court to follow state practice-or "procedural"--permitting the feder-
al court to entertain whatever form of suit its own rules allow. The measure
of "substance" in diversity cases is not nominal classification but effect on the
outcome of litigation.53 Consequently, should a federal court in Pennsylvania
of any compromise. See Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721 (6th Cir. 1942); Birnbaum v.
Birrell, 17 F.RD. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Cross v. Oneida Paper Products Co., 117 F.
Supp. 919 (D.N.J. 1954). FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a) also gives any member of a true class
who may be inadequately represented a right to intervene. See 3 MooRa ff 23.12.
In any case, members of a spurious class not before the court are not bound by the
adjudication. See All Am. Airways, Inc. v. Elderd, 209 F2d 247, 248 (2d Cir. 1954);
York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503, 529 (2d Cir. 1944), rev'd on other grounds,
326 U.S. 99 (1945); Shipley v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R., 7 F.R.D. 744 (W.D. Pa. 1948).
Thus, no reason would exist to bring an action against derelict representatives.
51. See Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the
Preliminary Draft, 25 Gzo. L.J. 551 (1937); Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Actions,
32 ILL. L. REV. 307, 314-15 (1937). See also U.S. SuPRE CotuR ADvIsoRy Com. oN
R UEs FOR CIVIL PROCEDULRE PROPOsED Rum s OF CIVIL PROCEDURE rule 23(a) (1) note
(1937).
52. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
53. State practice is regarded as "substantive" if the federal court's deviation from
it in a diversity case would produce a result at variance with that obtainable in a court
of the state where the federal court is sitting. For state rules that have been found
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frame its judgment in a class action to secure the same outcome that a state
court would reach in an entity suit, the "substance" test would be met.
Although an injunction is equally binding whether against a union as an
entity or against its members as a class, 54 the effect of a money judgment may
vary when the members rather than the union itself are sued. 55 In Pennsyl-
"substantive" under the Erie doctrine and followed by federal courts, see, e.g., Cities
Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208 (1939) (burden of proof); Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (conflict of laws) ; Guaranty Trust Co.
v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (statute of limitations). See also Clark, State Law in the
Federal Courts: The Brooding Ominipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YA. L.J. 267
(1946). For a limitation on Erie, see Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S.
525, 537 (1958):
It may well be that in the instant personal-injury case the outcome would be
substantially affected by whether the issue of immunity is decided by a judge or a
jury. Therefore, were "outcome" the only consideration, a strong case might appear
for saying that the federal court should follow the state practice.
The Court then held that "federal policy favoring jury decisions of disputed fact ques-
tions" is paramount. This case is noted in The Supreme Court, 1957 Term, 72 Hv. L.
REv. 77, 147-50 (1958).
54. Injunctions in entity actions are binding upon all members who have knowledge
of their terms. See Armstrong v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. 341, 159 Pac. 1176 (1916) ;
Great Lakes Greyhound Lines v. International Union UAW-CIO, 341 Mich. 290, 67
N.W.2d 105 (1954), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 804 (1955) (temporary restraining or-
der) ; People ex rel. Stearns v. Marr, 181 N.Y. 463, 468-70, 74 N.E. 431, 433-34 (1905).
For a class action case with similar effect, see United Packing House Workers v. Boyn-
ton, 240 Iowa 212, 35 N.W.2d 881 (1949); cf. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble,
255 U.S. 356 (1921) ; System Fed'n No. 91, Ry. Employes' Dep't v. Reed, 180 F.2d 991,
998 (6th Cir. 1950). See also 3 MooRE f 23.11; Witmer, Trade Union Liability: The
Problem of the Unincorporated Corporation, 51 YALE L.J. 40, 51-52 (1941). For Penn-
sylvania injunction cases under the class and entity rules, compare Patterson v. Wyo-
ming Valley District Council, 31 Pa. Super. 112, 119-20 (1906), and York Mfg. Co. v.
Oberdick, 10 Pa. Dist. 463 (C.P. 1901), with Wortex Mills, Inc. v. Textile Workers,
380 Pa. 3, 7-8, 109 A.2d 815, 817-18 (1954).
55. Statutes granting unions and other unincorporated associations capacity to sue
and be sued in their own name generally provide for the recovery of judgments out of
association assets. See, e.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 145 (1941) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 8-66
(1957); RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 78, comment c (1942). Some of these statutes ex-
pressly limit recovery to the common assets when a union is the only named defendant.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447.11 (1952); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 44-811 (1949).
The existence of the entity action, permitting recovery against the union treasury, does
not preclude the joinder of individual members as defendants and the imposition of per-
sonal liability. PA. R. Civ. P. 2153 (c) (1953). Some statutes specify, however, that
no levy may be imposed on individual defendants unless union assets fail to satisfy the
judgment. See, e.g., CoN. GEN. STAT. § 52-292 (1958); TEXAs REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 6137 (1949). Other statutes allow recovery from the union members even when the
union itself is the only named defendant. See, e.g., DEa. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3904 (1953);
VERMONT STAT. § 1565 (1947).
When union members are sued as a class, some courts deny recovery from the com-
mon assets on the ground that all the members have not been joined. Although the class
action would be res judicata as to the issues involved, individual members, if brought
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vania (as in many states where a union may litigate in its own name), a judg-
ment against a union will support a recovery only against union assets' 3
Since the class action may no longer be used in Pennsylvania by individuals
representing union members, the state rule for recovery in class actions pro-
vides no guide for a federal court framing a judgment against such repre-
sentatives. Some jurisdictions which authorize union-member class actions
permit a money judgment to be satisfied out of the union treasury.57 More
important, this practice obtained in Pennsylvania prior to that state's adop-
tion of its entity statute ;58 the new law was designed to affect only procedure
before the court in a suit on the judgment, might succeed in showing that they were
not within the class, or that they had not participated in or ratified the conduct which
gave rise to damages. Permitting a judgment to run against their proportionate share
of the common assets would violate the common-law rule that a member of an association
not before the court may not be subjected to a money judgment merely because of his
membership. Recovery is therefore limited to the assets of those individuals shown in
court to have been assenting members of the class. See Benz v. Compania Naviera Hi-
dalgo, S.A., 233 F.2d 62, 67-68 (9th Cir.), cert. denied on this issue, 352 U.S. 890 (1956),
aff'd on other grounds, 353 U.S. 138 (1957) ; Pascale v. Emery, 95 F. Supp. 147 (D.
Mass. 1951); Malloy v. Carroll, 287 Mass. 376, 391-92, 191 N.E. 661, 667-68 (1934);
Sweetman v. Barrows, 263 Mass. 349, 355, 161 N.E. 272, 275 (1928). Other jurisdic-
tions, regarding the class action as a means of holding the union itself liable, will per-
mit a judgment to be recovered from the union treasury. See United Packing House
Workers v. Boynton, 240 Iowa 212, 221, 35 N.W.2d 881, 887 (1949) ; Bayci v. Rango,
304 Ill. App. 203, 25 N.E.2d 1015 (1940); Colt v. Hicks, 97 Ind. App. 177, 191-95,
179 N.E. 335, 340-42 (1933); Oster v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 271 Pa.
419, 114 Atl. 377 (1921) (dictum) ; CHAFEE, SOME PRoLBEINs oF Eguirr 221 (1950) ;
Kaplan, Suits Against Unincorporated Associations Under the Federal Riles of Civil
Procedure, 53 MicH. L. REv. 945, 953-54 n.44 (1955) ; Witmer, Trade Union Liability:
The Problem of the Unincorporated Corporation, 51 YALE L.J. 40, 43-46 (1941).
56. A judgment entered against an association sued in the name of the association
or in the name of a trustee ad litem . . . shall support execution upon the
property of the association.
PA. R. Civ. P. 2158.
No trustee ad litem and no individual member of an association shall be liable
for the payment of a money judgment entered against the association as such
PA. R. CIV. P. 2155; 3 GooDmcH-AmRAm §§ 2155-1, 2158-1 (citing cases).
An individual member may be held liable for association obligations if he is personal-
ly joined and shown to have engaged in or later ratified the transaction. PA. R. Civ. P.
2153(c); Kaplan v. Delaware County Republican Executive Comm., 7 Pa. D. & C.2d
554, 43 Del. County 229 (C.P. 1956) (dictum); Creighton v. Media Troop No. 1,
B.S.A., 38 Del. County 410 (Pa. C.P. 1951) ; 3 GooDmcs-AmRAm §§ 2153(c)-1, 2155-1.
57. See note 55 supra.
58. Wortex Mills, Inc. v. Textile Workers, 380 Pa. 3, 18, 109 A.2d 815, 822-23
(1954) (dictum); Pennsylvania Co. v. Houseman, 341 Pa. 311, 319-20, 19 A.2d 148,
151-52 (1941) ; Oster v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 271 Pa. 419, 114 Atl. 377
(1921) (dictum); Maisch v. Order of Americus, 223 Pa. 199, 201, 72 At. 528 (1909)
(dictum) ; see Note of Procedural Rules Committee to PA. R. Civ. P. 2153(c). But cf.
Humphrys v. Republican Cent. Campaign Comm., 320 Pa. 353, 182 At]. 366 (1936)
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and not to alter the substantive liability of unions.59 In addition, the Third
Circuit could have recognized that the class-action device was used only to
obtain diversity jurisdiction, that, had the same controversy been litigated in
state court, the unions would have appeared as entities, and that the entity-
action damage remedy would therefore be appropriate. Thus, had the trial
court in Underwood found against the defendant union members, it could
have satisfied Erie requirements on either (or both) of two theories permit-
ting a money judgment to be recovered from the union treasury.
Admittedly, had the Underwood court heard the class action, the outcome
would have been superficially different from that obtainable in local courts,
inasmuch as Pennsylvania would not have entertained the class action at all.
But the Erie mandate could still have been observed. A federal court exer-
cising diversity jurisdiction must attempt to rule as a court of the forum
state only when a divergent result would defeat an ascertainable state poli-
cy.-0 And, in Underwood, federal jurisdiction was not inconsistent with local
policy. Pennsylvania made the class action unavailable to members of unin-
corporated associations because it had enabled such associations to litigate
as entities. 61 Hence, that state sought to facilitate actions by and against unin-
corporated associations-not to limit the scope of federal diversity jurisdic-
tion. Federal jurisdiction based on a class suit would therefore be anything
but incompatible with the Pennsylvania statute permitting unincorporated
(common assets not available if committee member had not authorized or ratified trans-
action).
Members of unincorporated associations were not treated as partners and did not in-
cur a joint liability for association obligations merely by accepting membership. They
could, however, be held individually liable for the association's debts on an agency
theory if they engaged in or assented to the undertaking, or later ratified it. Bloom v.
Vauclain, 329 Pa. 460, 463, 198 At. 78, 79 (1938) ; Dunlop Printing Co. v. Ryan, 275
Pa. 556, 560-62, 119 Atl. 714, 716 (1923); Ash v. Guie, 97 Pa. 493, 499-500 (1881);
Franklin Paper Co. v. Gorman, 76 Pa. Super. 276, 280 (1921); 3 GooDmicH-AmRA §
2155-2 n.6.
59. 3 Goomaicr-AmnAm §§ 2153(a)-2, (c)-1.
60. A state statutory provision may not be controlling if it appears to constitute
a formal requirement or a rule of convenience rather than a reasoned state policy. See
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Co-op., 356 U.S. 525, 536-38 (1958) (federal policy of having jury
determine questions of fact unaffected by different allocation between judge and jury in
state court); Note, 56 YALE LJ. 1037, 1045-46 (1947) (discussing the applicability of
Erie to state forum non conveniens rules). Bzt cf. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350
U.S. 198 (1956); First Nat'l Bank v. United Air Lines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396, 401 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
61. See 3 GooDRicH-AxRAa §§ 2151-2 n.6, 2152-2, 2156(a)-1, 2158-1. For discussion
of the desirability of entity status for unions, see United Mine Workers v. Coronado
Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 383-92 (1922); Busby v. Electric Util. Employees Union, 147
F.2d 865 (D.C. Cir. 1945); WARRmN, CORPORATE ADVANTAGES WITHOUT INCORPORATION
22-24 (1929) ; Sturges. Unincorporated Associations as Parties to Actions, 33 YALE L.J.
383 (1924).
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associations to enforce their rights, and making it possible to hold them ac-
countable for their wrongs.62
Although the class action would have appropriately served to bring the
Underwood litigation into federal court-and is frequently used to assure di-
verse citizenship 6 -it affords a tortuous if not irrational route to diversity
jurisdiction. To litigate on behalf of a class, would-be litigants must establish
adequacy of representation 64 and the impracticability of joining all members
of the class.65 In addition, the existence of diversity need bear no relation to
the locus of union activity, for the pertinent citizenship is that of the persons
fortuitously, or forehandedly, chosen as class representatives. 6 Diverse citi-
zenship may thus arise or be created in cases which cannot subserve the pur-
pose of diversity jurisdiction-enabling out-of-state litigants to gain entry into
federal court.
67
If a union's members, like a corporation's shareholders, were conclusively
presumed to have a single citizenship, diversity jurisdiction could be achieved
in union litigation by a more rational means than the class action. A single
union "citizenship" recognized in all federal courts would presumably carry
with it capacity to litigate as an entity in diversity cases wherever arising.
62. See Spotz's Estate, 51 Pa. D. & C. 427, 440-41 (Orphans' Ct. 1944); 3 Gror-
IcH-AmRAm § 2153 (a) -2:
[A]ssociation activities may be conducted on so large and extended a scale that the
plaintiff . . . may be unable to ascertain who are the members and officers of the
association .... The rule therefore permits the plaintiff to sue the unincorporated
association in its association name without naming any members or officers as
parties defendant ....
An unincorporated association has just as much actual existence . . . as any
corporation .... If it has sufficient existence to have a separate bank account or
to borrow money it has sufficient existence to be sued ... in its own name.
63. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
64. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a), quoted note 7 supra. See note 48 su pra.
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). See notes 7, 32 supra and accompanying text.
Also, the effect of money judgments is less certain when suit is brought against a
class rather than an entity. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
66. See cases cited note 8 supra. If jurisdiction is based on a collusive naming of
parties to create diversity, the federal court may dismiss. See 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1952) ;
Mathies v. Seymour Mfg. Co., 23 F.R.D. 64, 83-85 (D. Conn. 1958) (since class repre-
sentative had real interest in litigation and had not surrendered control over conduct of
action to those without requisite citizenship, there was no collusion and district court
had jurisdiction) ; Cashman v. Amador & Sacramento Canal Co., 118 U.S. 58, 61 (1886) ;
Detroit v. Dean, 106 U.S. 537, 541 (1882); Farr v. Detroit Trust Co., 116 F.2d 807,
811-12 (6th Cir. 1941) ; Marvin v. Ellis, 9 Fed. 367 (C.C.E.D. La. 1881).
67. On that purpose, see Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Granch)
61, 87 (1809) ; Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938) ; Parker, Dual Sovereign-
ty and the Federal Courts, 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 407, 409 (1956); Yntema & Jaffin, Pre-
lininary Analysis of Cowurrent Jurisdiction, 79 U. PA. L. Ray. 869, 880-81 n.22 (1931).
For the view that Erie applied in its fullest measure would repudiate the policy on which
diversity jurisdiction rests, see Note, 56 YALE L.J. 1037, 1047 n.55 (1947).
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Put a capacity of this scope would conflict with rule 17(b)'s directive that
the capacity of an unincorporated association be determined by the law of the
forum state. Similarly, such capacity, by allowing a union in a diversity ac-
tion to secure or be subjected to judgments which the courts of the forum
state might not grant, could violate the Erie doctrine. The precedent of a
single citizenship for corporate shareholders would be of little assistance in
solving the Erie problems which would arise were a union's members deemed
to have a common citizenship. Unlike a union, a corporation is endowed with
a capacity to litigate recognized by all jurisdictions. 8 Nevertheless, a com-
mon citizenship for union members and a grant of union capacity to litigate
as an entity could be reconciled with rule 17(b) and Erie. For example, those
federal courts which hear diversity cases in states where unions may litigate
as entities 69 would presume that all a union's members are citizens of the
state in which the union has its principal executive offices;70 and, in states
where unions have no entity capacity, this presumption would not arise. Of
course, whether or not union members are accorded a single citizenship in
entity jurisdictions will depend in part on contemporary attitudes toward di-
versity jurisdiction.71 So long as diversity jurisdiction remains as readily in-
68. See note 40 supra.
69. Not all organizations having capacity to sue and be sued as entities under state
law need be treated by the federal courts as citizens for purposes of diversity juris-
diction. See Great So. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449 (1900) (even though
partnership had entity status and was termed a "citizen" under Pennsylvania law, it was
not a citizen for diversity purposes). The standard for determination might instead be
whether the organization were sufficiently like a corporation. See American Fed'n of
Musicians v. Stein, 213 F2d 679, 686-88 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 873 (1954);
Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476 (1933).
70. Advocates of single union citizenship generally propose locating it in the state
where the union's principal place of business is maintained. See 3 MOORE f1 17.25, at
1413; Comment, 66 YALE L.J. 712, 749 (1957). This rule for unions would correspond to
the treatment of corporations which are now deemed to be citizens of the state where
their principal place of business is located, see note 71 infra, as well as of their chartering
state. Although a corporation's principal place of business may be readily ascertained,
see Comment, 58 CoLum. L. REv. 1287, 1295-98 (1958), a union's "business" cannot be
measured by such standards as the location of manufacturing facilities or the volume of
sales. Compare Sperry Prods., Inc. v. Association of Am. Railroads, 132 F.2d 408, 412
(2d Cir. 1942) (concurring opinion). A more reasonable locus for union citizenship
would be the state where its principal executive offices are maintained. This rule would
assure uniformity by avoiding the question of whether the principal place of business is in
the state from which authority is exercised or the state where the greatest proportion of
the membership is concentrated. Moreover, the executive-offices rule would tie citizen-
ship to the state where union policy is formed and the entire membership is best repre-
sented. Compare 2 RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAws: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 115 (1947)
(domicile of partnership located at central offices).
71. A synopsis of the arguments for and against diversity jurisdiction is given in
Comment, 58 COLUm. L. REv. 1287, 1302 n.105 (1958).
Congress has recently limited the scope of diversity jurisdiction over corporations by
deeming a corporation to be a "citizen" of both the state where its principal place of
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vocable as it is today, however, union members should be able to sue or be
sued in federal courts as easily as other litigants.
business is located and the state of incorporation. See Act of July 25, 1958, 72 Stat.
415, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (Supp. 1958), amending 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1952); S. Rep. No.
1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). Prior to this legislation, a corporation chartered in a
state other than the one where it conducted its principal activities had ready access to the
federal court in the latter state because of its foreign citizenship, even though the con-
troversy was of a purely local nature. Thus, the policy upon which diversity jurisdiction
is based-protecting out-of-state litigants from the supposed chauvinism of local courts,
see authorities cited note 64 supra-was perverted. By considering a corporation to be a
citizen both of the state of its principal place of business and of its incorporation, the
new legislation limits the access to federal courts through this "artificial diversity."
Since a union's citizenship could be tied to the state where its principal offices are lo-
cated, the foregoing problem of corporate citizenship need not arise.
